

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE  
WESTERN DIVISION

JOHN GRIFFIN,

Plaintiff,

VS.

NANCY CARY, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 06-2036-B/V

ORDER ASSESSING \$250 CIVIL FILING FEE  
ORDER OF DISMISSAL  
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL  
ORDER CERTIFYING APPEAL NOT TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH  
AND  
NOTICE OF APPELLATE FILING FEE

Plaintiff John Griffin, prisoner number 330446, an inmate at the West Tennessee Detention Facility ("WTDF")<sup>1</sup> in Mason, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1974), on January 18, 2006, along with a motion seeking appointment of counsel.<sup>2</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> The word "prison" is used in this order to refer to all places of confinement or incarceration, including jails, penal farms, detention and classification facilities, or halfway houses.

<sup>2</sup> Although the complaint states, on its face, that it is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Griffin is being housed in a federal detention facility. In order to state a § 1983 claim, plaintiff must allege action under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 55-57 (1988). Because plaintiff is in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, which acts under color of federal law, the Court construes the complaint as one brought pursuant to Bivens.

Clerk shall record the defendant as Nancy Cary, the Nurse Manager at the WTDF.<sup>3</sup>

#### I. Assessment of Filing Fee

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), all prisoners bringing a civil action must pay the full filing fee of \$250 required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).<sup>4</sup> The in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), merely provides the prisoner the opportunity to make a "downpayment" of a partial filing fee and pay the remainder in installments.

In this case, plaintiff has properly completed and submitted an in forma pauperis affidavit and a certified copy of his trust fund account statement. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), it is ORDERED that the plaintiff cooperate fully with prison officials in carrying out this order. It is further ORDERED that the trust fund officer at plaintiff's prison shall calculate a partial initial filing fee equal to twenty percent (20%) of the greater of the average balance in or deposits to the plaintiff's trust fund account for the six months immediately preceding the

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<sup>3</sup> Although the complaint also purports to sue two unnamed individuals, identified as "John Doe #1" and "Jane Doe #2," service of process cannot be made on a fictitious party. Moreover, the filing of a complaint against "John Doe" defendants does not toll the running of the statute of limitation against those parties. See Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996); Bufalino v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 404 F.2d 1023, 1028 (6th Cir. 1968). Thus, to the extent that plaintiff seeks to bring any complaint against any other individual or entity, he must identify the defendant and file a new lawsuit within the one-year statute of limitations applicable to Bivens actions. Mason v. Department of Justice, 39 Fed. Appx. 205, 207 (6th Cir. June 17, 2002); see also Merriweather v. City of Memphis, 107 F.3d 396, 398 n.1 (6th Cir. 1997) ("In federal constitutional tort actions, the court borrows the statute of limitations for personal torts from the state where the claim arose—here, Tennessee."); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a).

<sup>4</sup> Because this action was commenced prior to April 9, 2006, the new \$350 civil filing fee is inapplicable.

completion of the affidavit. When the account contains any funds, the trust fund officer shall collect them and pay them directly to the Clerk of Court. If the funds in plaintiff's account are insufficient to pay the full amount of the initial partial filing fee, the prison official is instructed to withdraw all of the funds in the plaintiff's account and forward them to the Clerk of Court. On each occasion that funds are subsequently credited to plaintiff's account the prison official shall immediately withdraw those funds and forward them to the Clerk of Court, until the initial partial filing fee is paid in full.

It is further ORDERED that after the initial partial filing fee is fully paid, the trust fund officer shall withdraw from the plaintiff's account and pay to the Clerk of this Court monthly payments equal to twenty percent (20%) of all deposits credited to plaintiff's account during the preceding month, but only when the amount in the account exceeds \$10.00, until the entire \$250.00 filing fee is paid.

Each time that the trust fund officer makes a payment to the Court as required by this order, he shall print a copy of the prisoner's account statement showing all activity in the account since the last payment under this order and file it with the Clerk along with the payment.

All payments and account statements shall be sent to:

Clerk, United States District Court, Western District of  
Tennessee, 167 N. Main, Room 242, Memphis, TN 38103

and shall clearly identify plaintiff's name and the case number on the first page of this order.

If plaintiff is transferred to a different prison or released, he is ORDERED to notify the Court immediately of his change of address. If still confined he shall provide the officials at the new prison with a copy of this order.

If the plaintiff fails to abide by these or any other requirement of this order, the Court may impose appropriate sanctions, including a monetary fine, without any additional notice or hearing by the Court.

The Clerk shall mail a copy of this order to the prison official in charge of prison trust fund accounts at plaintiff's prison. The Clerk is further ORDERED to forward a copy of this order to the warden of the WTDF to ensure that the custodian of the plaintiff's inmate trust account complies with that portion of the PLRA pertaining to the payment of filing fees.

The obligation to pay this filing fee shall continue despite the immediate dismissal of this case. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Clerk shall not issue process or serve any papers in this case.

## II. Analysis of Plaintiff's Claims

The plaintiff was apparently transferred to the WTDF from a state prison in Vermont for an unspecified reason. The complaint alleges that, from September 22, 2005 until December 28, 2005, defendant Cary failed to provide the plaintiff with a knee brace that had apparently been prescribed while he was in prison in Vermont for severe knee pain and tendonitis. The complaint further alleges, vaguely, that Cary also failed to provide medical attention "and negligently handled [plaintiff's] treatment under her care." It appears that "CCA Medical employees [withheld]

pertinent medical files" that had been received from the Vermont Department of Correction ("VTDOC") and that defendant Cary stated, falsely, that she had not received the plaintiff's medical file from Vermont. It is also asserted that "Nurse Cary had said files, was fully aware of [plaintiff's] condition and choose [sic] to do nothing to correct" the negligent care the plaintiff received. As a result, the plaintiff claims he suffered physical pain and "irreparable [sic] damage" to his knee.<sup>5</sup>

The plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages.

The Sixth Circuit has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) requires a district court to dismiss a complaint without prejudice whenever a prisoner brings a prison conditions claim without demonstrating that he has exhausted his administrative remedies. Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102 (6th Cir. 1998); see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) ("[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong."); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001) (prisoner seeking only money damages must exhaust administrative remedies although damages are unavailable through grievance system). This requirement places an affirmative burden on prisoners of pleading particular facts

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<sup>5</sup> These allegations are contradicted, to some extent, by the allegations in the documents attached to the complaint, including a grievance plaintiff filed with the VTDOC on or about December 22, 2005 and a letter he wrote to a doctor employed by the VTDOC dated December 22, 2005. Those documents indicate that plaintiff's entire medical file was not forwarded to the WTDF and, in particular, the WTDF had no documentation supporting the plaintiff's need for a knee brace.

demonstrating the complete exhaustion of claims. Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2000). To comply with the mandates of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a),

a prisoner must plead his claims with specificity and show that they have been exhausted by attaching a copy of the applicable administrative dispositions to the complaint or, in the absence of written documentation, describe with specificity the administrative proceeding and its outcome.

Id. at 642; see also Boyd v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 380 F.3d 989, 985-96 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing the standard for demonstrating exhaustion when prison officials fail to respond in a timely manner to a grievance), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 920 (2005); Baxter v. Rose, 305 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2002) (prisoner who fails to allege exhaustion adequately may not amend his complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal); Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 503-04 (6th Cir. 2001) (no abuse of discretion for district court to dismiss for failure to exhaust when plaintiffs did not submit documents showing complete exhaustion of their claims or otherwise demonstrate exhaustion). Furthermore, § 1997(e) requires the prisoner to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit and, therefore, he cannot exhaust those remedies during the pendency of the action. Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999). Finally, the Sixth Circuit recently has held that district courts are required to dismiss a complaint in its entirety, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), that contains any unexhausted claims. Jones Bey v. Johnson, 407 F.3d 801, 805-09 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Rinard v. Luoma, 440 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2006)

(prisoner may not amend his complaint to delete defendants against whom claims have not been exhausted).

The BOP has adopted an administrative remedy program, 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.19, that is applicable to Bivens actions. See, e.g., Robinson v. Young, No. 00-6127, 20 Fed. Appx. 476, 477 (6th Cir. Sept. 26, 2001); Barksdale v. Rauschel, No. 99-2233, 2000 WL 1434492, at \*1 (6th Cir. Sept. 18, 2000). The warden has the initial responsibility for responding to grievances. 28 C.F.R. § 542.11(a). An inmate who is not satisfied with the warden's response may appeal to the BOP's regional director "within 20 calendar days of the date the Warden signed the response" and, thereafter, to the general counsel of the BOP "within 30 calendar days of the date the Regional Director signed the response." Id. § 542.15(a). According to the regulations, "response shall be made by the Warden . . . within 20 calendar days; by the Regional Director within 30 calendar days; and by the General Counsel within 40 calendar days." Id. § 542.18.

In this case, the plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of demonstrating, through particularized averments, that he exhausted his administrative remedies as to his claim. The plaintiff filed a grievance on or about November 15, 2005 that names defendant Cary, as required by Moorer v. Price, 83 Fed. Appx. 770, 772 (6th Cir. Dec. 9, 2003) (plaintiff did not exhaust claim against warden because his grievance did not identify the warden or articulate any claim against her); Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 733-34 (6th Cir. 2003); and Curry, 249 F.3d at 504. The grievance

officer denied the grievance on or about December 5, 2005 on the grounds that "[w]e do not allow knee braces with metal in them" and nothing in the plaintiff's file documents his need for a brace. The plaintiff indicated he did not wish to pursue an appeal. Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

The Sixth Circuit recently stated that "[a] plaintiff who fails to allege exhaustion of administrative remedies through 'particularized averments' does not state a claim on which relief may be granted, and his complaint must be dismissed sua sponte." Baxter, 305 F.3d at 489. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the complaint, without prejudice, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).<sup>6</sup> The motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED as moot.

### III. Appeal Issues

The next issue to be addressed is whether plaintiff should be allowed to appeal this decision in forma pauperis. Twenty-eight U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides that an appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.

The good faith standard is an objective one. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). An appeal is not taken in good faith if the issue presented is frivolous. Id. Accordingly, it would be inconsistent for a district court to determine that a

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<sup>6</sup> As the Sixth Circuit has explained, "If the plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies, he may always refile his complaint and plead exhaustion with sufficient detail to meet our heightened pleading requirement, assuming that the relevant statute of limitations has not run." Baxter, 305 F.3d at 489.



complaint should be dismissed prior to service on the defendants, yet has sufficient merit to support an appeal in forma pauperis. See Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983). The same considerations that lead the Court to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim also compel the conclusion that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.

It is therefore CERTIFIED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal in this matter by plaintiff is not taken in good faith and plaintiff may not proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.

The final matter to be addressed is the assessment of a filing fee if plaintiff appeals the dismissal of this case.<sup>7</sup> In McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997), the Sixth Circuit set out specific procedures for implementing the PLRA. Therefore, the plaintiff is instructed that, if he wishes to take advantage of the installment procedures for paying the appellate filing fee, he must comply with the procedures set out in McGore and § 1915(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED this 19<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2006.

s/ J. DANIEL BREEN  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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<sup>7</sup> Effective April 9, 2006, the fee for docketing an appeal is \$450. See Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, ¶ 1, Note following 28 U.S.C. § 1913. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1917, a district court also charges a \$5 fee:

Upon the filing of any separate or joint notice of appeal or application for appeal or upon the receipt of any order allowing, or notice of the allowance of, an appeal or of a writ of certiorari \$5 shall be paid to the clerk of the district court, by the appellant or petitioner.